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Abstract
The n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where
individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been
analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be
considered as isolated events. For this case, and assuming simple trigger strategies
and many iterations per game, we analyse the rate of convergence to the
evolutionarily stable populations. We find that for some values of the payoff
parameters of the Prisoner’s Dilemma this rate is so low that the assumption, that
mutations in the population are infrequent on that timescale, is unreasonable.
Furthermore, the problem is compounded as the group size is increased. In order
to address this issue, we derive a deterministic approximation of the evolutionary
dynamics with explicit, stochastic mutation processes, valid when the population
size is large. We then analyse how the evolutionary dynamics depends on the
following factors: mutation rate, group size, the value of the payoff parameters,
and the structure of the initial population. In order to carry out the simulations
for groups of more than just a few individuals, we derive an efficient way of
calculating the fitness values. We find that when the mutation rate per individual
and generation is very low, the dynamics is characterised by populations which are
evolutionarily stable. As the mutation rate is increased, other fixed points with a
higher degree of cooperation become stable. For some values of the payoff
parameters, the system is characterised by (apparently) stable limit cycles
dominated by cooperative behaviour. The parameter regions corresponding to
high degree of cooperation grow in size with the mutation rate, and in number
with the group size. For some parameter values, we find more than one stable
fixed point, corresponding to different structures of the initial population.
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1 Introduction
In social and natural systems, the action of an individual often affects a
number of other individuals, and there are numerous examples of situations
where so-called free riders or defectors take advantage of others cooperating
for a common good (Hardin, 1968; Maynard Smith, 1982; Sugden, 1986).
A game-theoretic approach for the study of cooperation can be based on the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Flood, 1958; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965) – a
situation that captures the temptation to act in a selfish way to gain a
higher own reward instead of sharing a reward by cooperating. In the game,
the players independently choose an action, either to defect or to cooperate.
In the two-person game, the scores are R (reward) for mutual cooperation, T
(temptation score) for defection against a cooperator, S (sucker’s payoff) for
cooperation against a defector, and P (punishment) for mutual defection,
with the inequalities S < P < R < T and (usually) R > (T + S)/2. We use
fixed values on R and S in this study, R = 1 and S = 0, while
0 < P < 1 < T < 2. (In the population dynamics we use there are only three
independent parameters, the third one being a growth constant.) From
theoretic and simulation studies of two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game, it
is known under which circumstances repeated interactions may allow for a
cooperative population to be established that can resist invasion by
non-cooperative mutants (see, e.g., Rapoport and Chammah, 1965;
Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Molander, 1985; Axelrod, 1987; Miller, 1996;
Lindgren, 1992; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992).
In the n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game, n players simultaneously choose
an action, whether to cooperate or to defect. In the literature, there are
several evolutionary models based on the n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma using
various strategy sets and pairing mechanisms, e.g., where the players are
distributed in space. To our knowledge, the first evolutionary models of this
type are those by Matsuo (1985) and Adachi and Matsuo (1991, 1992),
where individuals simultaneously play on a square lattice. A similar cellular
automaton was presented by Albin (1992). In these models, a player
performs a certain action every round depending on previous actions of the
nearest neighbours. Fitness is given by joint actions of the player and its
nearest neighbours. This means that an action at a certain position may
influence the play at distant sites in the course of the iterated game. Models
based on local groups on a lattice, where each player participates in several
overlapping but isolated games (see, e.g., Matsushima and Ikegami, 1998;
Lindgren and Johansson, 2001), can much more easily exhibit a high degree
of cooperation - the main mechanism being a kind of kin or group selection
allowing for the formation of stable cooperative clusters, as has also been
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observed for the 2-person game (Nowak and May, 1993;
Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994). Hauert and Schuster (1997) give a model
involving probabilistic strategies with finite memory. They find that an
error-correcting strategy type, previously studied in the context of the
2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma in (Lindgren, 1992) and under the name
“Pavlov” in (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993), may perform successfully also in
the multi-player case. Other extensions of the strategy space introduce
longer memory in terms of internal states (see, e.g.,
Akimov and Soutchanski, 1997; Lindgren and Johansson, 2001).
In this paper, we revisit the classic n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. Following
Boyd and Richerson (1988) and Molander (1992), the behaviours of the
participants are modelled by simple reactive strategies. These authors
analyse the stability of stationary populations in the limit where mutations
are infrequent: a mutation either is driven to extinction by the selective
pressure from the resident population, or leads to a new resident population.
The general conclusion from their studies is that cooperation is difficult to
obtain when extending the group size beyond the two persons in the original
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. When mutations are infrequent, we find that for
some values of the payoff parameters, the rate of convergence to the
evolutionarily stable populations is so low that the assumption that
mutations in the population are infrequent on that timescale is unreasonable.
Furthermore, the problem is compounded as the group size is increased. In
order to address this issue, we derive a deterministic approximation of the
evolutionary dynamics with explicit, stochastic mutation processes, valid
when the population size is large. Among the questions we analyse are: How
does the evolutionary dynamics, and especially the long-term average degree
of cooperation, depend on how frequently mutations occur in the
population? To what extent does the choice of parameter values in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix affect the outcome? How does the
evolutionary dynamics depend on the group size?
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we define the multi-person
game and the strategy set used in our study. In Section 3, the evolutionary
dynamics with an explicit flow of mutations is presented, and we review the
evolutionary stability analysis in the case of infrequent mutations. In
Section 4, we derive a deterministic approximation to the evolutionary
dynamics with mutations, and present the new method for rapid calculation
of fitness levels. In Section 5, the results from simulations and numerical
analysis of the evolutionary dynamics is presented and discussed. In
Section 6 we conclude with a summary and outlook.
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2 The n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game
In this section, we review the n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game and define
the strategy set used in our study. Each player interacts with n− 1 other
players. Depending on the number k of others cooperating, a player receives
the score V(C|k) when cooperating and the higher score V(D|k) when
defecting. The scores increase with an increasing number of cooperators, and
also the total score given to all players increases if one player switches from
defection to cooperation, see, e.g., Boyd and Richerson (1988). Thus


V(D|k) > V(D|k − 1) and V(C|k) > V(C|k − 1)
V(D|k) > V(C|k)
(k + 1) V(C|k) + (n− k − 1) V(D|k + 1) >
k V(C|k − 1) + (n− k) V(D|k).
(1)
In this paper we shall assume that the scores V can be calculated as a linear
combination of the scores against the other players in n− 1 ordinary
two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games:
V(C|k) =
k
n− 1
and V(D|k) = T
k
n− 1
+ P
n− k − 1
n− 1
, (2)
where we have divided by n− 1 in order to make it easier to compare results
from different group sizes. The parameters P and T obey
0 < P < 1 < T < 2. Note that this is still an n-person game since the same
action is performed simultaneously in all games. This is a more general game
than the one studied by Boyd and Richerson (1988), since they assume that
T − P = 1 (corresponding to a line in our parameter region), but less general
than the payoff functions considered in (Molander, 1992). Other score
functions that fulfil the conditions in (1) are expected to yield similar results
(c.f. Molander, 1992), and it is straightforward to extend the the numerical
methods in this paper to arbitrary score functions V(C|k) and V(D|k), using
the method for evaluating the fitness values presented in Section 4.
It is assumed that the players have no way of coordinating their choices, and
that all player wish to maximise their score. Hence, in the single round
game, the optimal choice of action is to defect, and this leads to all players
in the group defecting and scoring only P < 1 instead of 1, which they get if
all cooperate. If there is a high probability that the group will play again, we
have the iterated n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma, and then cooperation may
develop under some circumstances.
We focus on the set of trigger strategies (Schelling, 1978) as the strategy
space for the evolution, which was also considered by, e.g.,
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Boyd and Richerson (1988) and Molander (1992). A trigger strategy sk is
characterised by the degree of cooperation that it requires in order to
continue to cooperate: a player with trigger strategy sk cooperates if at least
k other players cooperate. In a game with n participants, k is in the range
0, . . . , n. The strategy s0 is an unconditional cooperator and sn is an
unconditional defector. Each player decides whether to cooperate or to
defect based on the actions of the other players. In the first round after the
formation of a group, all players are assumed to cooperate, with the
exception of unconditional defectors. Then the players that are unhappy
with the number of cooperators switch to defection. This may cause other
players to change their action, and this is iterated until a stable
configuration has been reached. Note that the number of cooperators may
only decrease or be stable, and that this procedure converges to the stable
configuration with the maximum number of cooperators. In a repeated game
without noise, this implies that a group of players with different trigger
levels reaches a certain degree of cooperation, some players may be satisfied
and cooperate while the others defect. Despite their simplicity, trigger
strategies capture many important aspects of the many-person game, and
allow for straight-forward evaluation of the expected score for a player in a
group randomly generated from a given population.
It should be noted that some aspects of this game depend very strongly on
the expected number of iterations (Boyd and Richerson, 1988); most notably,
the ability to defend against pure defectors in large groups requires very long
games, to offset the cost of initial cooperative actions when defectors are
present in a group. In this article, however, we focus on the role of mutations
in the evolutionary dynamics. For simplicity, and in order to treat the fitness
values analytically, we limit the study to the simpler situation when the
games are infinitely iterated, and we use the average score per player and
round as a fitness variable for the selection in the population dynamics. This
assumption can also be interpreted as a one-round game with players making
binding contracts in a negotiation before the game.
3 Evolutionary dynamics
Consider a population of N individuals. From one generation to the next, a
fraction δ of the population is replaced using fitness proportional selection,
where the fitness of an individual is proportional to the number of offspring
surviving to reproductive age. Throughout this paper, δ = 0.1. If small
enough, the value of δ does not influence the structure of the evolving
population, but determines the evolutionary time scale. Assuming that the
population size is large and constant, the evolutionary dynamics takes the
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form of
x′l = xl + δ
(
fl
f¯
− 1
)
xl , (3)
where xl is the fraction of players in the population with trigger level l, x
′
l is
the value of xl in the next generation, fl is the expected fitness for a player
with trigger level l, and f¯ =
n∑
l=0
xlfl is the average fitness in the population.
The expected fitness fl for a player with trigger level l is the expected score
of the player in a randomly formed group:
fl =
n∑
i1, ..., in−1=0
xi1 · · · xin−1 S(l, i1, . . . , in−1) (4)
where S(l, i1, . . . , in−1) is the score of a player with strategy sl in a game
with n− 1 other players, using strategies si1, . . . , sin−1 respectively.
Molander (1992) gives an analysis of the model, with general score functions
V(C|k) and V(D|k), when it is assumed that a mutation will either lead to a
new resident population, or that the evolutionary dynamics will bring the
population back to the situation before the mutation. Molander shows that
in each interval P ∈ ( k−1
n−1
, k
n−1
), where k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}, there is either a
mixture of strategies sk and sn, which is evolutionarily stable, or there is a
mixture of strategies s0, . . . , sn−1 (all cooperating), that resists invasion by
strategy sn, but which is not evolutionarily stable. Finally, there is no other
asymptotically stable population in that interval. In the interval
P ∈ (n−2
n−1
, 1), the purely cooperative equilibrium mixture is the only possible
asymptotically stable population.
Suppose that a population with groups of size n consists of a mixture of
strategies sk and sn, in fractions x and 1− x, respectively. Since, in this
population, strategy sk cooperates if and only if there are at least k other
players with the same strategy in the group, and since strategy sn always
defects, direct evaluation of (4) gives
fk(x) =
k∑
i=1
P
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
xi−1(1− x)n−i +
+
n∑
i=k+1
i− 1
n− 1
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
xi−1(1− x)n−i (5)
for strategy sk and
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Fig. 1. The payoff at equilibrium as a function of P (thick line), for T = 1.2 and
group size n ∈ {2, . . . , 10}. Also shown is the payoff P (dashed line) for a population
of pure all-defect.
fn(x) =
k∑
i=0
P
(
n− 1
i
)
xi(1− x)n−i−1 +
+
n−1∑
i=k+1
[
P + (T − P )
i
n− 1
](
n− 1
i
)
xi(1− x)n−i−1, (6)
for strategy sn. We find the equilibrium by setting fk(x) = fn(x) and then
solving for x, with the requirement 0 < x < 1. Existence and uniqueness of
this equilibrium is guaranteed by the result of Molander (1992). In Fig. 1 we
show how the equilibrium fitness depends on P for T = 1.2, for group size
n ∈ {2, . . . , 10}. Note that the fitness at the asymptotically stable population
approaches f = P as n increases, indicating a decreasing degree of
cooperation. From the existence and uniqueness of the asymptotically stable
populations of this form, and from a Taylor expansion of fk and fn to the
order xk+1, follows that x ∼ 1/n at the asymptotically stable population, for
T > 1.
Consider a small perturbation of one of the evolutionarily stable populations
constituted by the strategies sk and sn. The long-term response by the
evolutionary dynamics to the perturbation is given by the eigenvalues λ of
the Jacobian of x′ − x at the evolutionarily stable population. We find that
the rate of convergence to the evolutionarily stable state approaches zero, as
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Fig. 2. Eigenvalues λ of the Jacobian for the replicator dynamics [c.f. (9)], at the
evolutionarily stable population, in the limit of infrequent mutations. After a small
perturbation, the dynamics eventually returns to the evolutionarily stable state, but
the time it takes to do so [characterised by −(ln 2)/λ], diverges as P approaches
1/3. The Jacobian, with elements Jij =
∂
∂xj
(fi − f¯), is evaluated at the stationary
population, was obtained from explicit expressions of fi and f¯ . These in turn were
calculated using (10) and Thm. 1.
P approaches k/(n− 1), for k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}. This is illustrated in Fig. 2
for n = 4 and P ∈ (0, 1/3). Thus, if P is close enough to k/(n− 1), the
evolutionary dynamics does not relax to the stationary population between
mutations even for the case when each perturbation is very small, provided
that they occur frequently enough. Since the selective forces are so weak, it
takes very long time to drive a mutation to extinction, and we conclude that
it is insufficient to analyse the evolutionary properties in the limit of
infrequent mutations. In the following, we extend the evolutionary dynamics
(3) to explicitly include the mutation process, and analyse how the
evolutionary dynamics is influenced by this process.
4 Evolutionary dynamics with mutations
We now introduce mutations as an explicit part of the evolutionary
dynamics. The population is subject to selection as in (3). In addition, a
number Ml→j of individuals per generation switch from strategy sl to
strategy sj due to mutations. The mutations are assumed to be generated by
stochastic events, e.g. by a Poisson process, in the process of reproduction.
We assume that the probability of surviving to reproductive age does not
depend on the offspring’s strategy, but only on that of the parent. Hence,
our measure of fitness comprises factors such as parental care, as well as
vying for resources. It follows that the evolutionary dynamics takes the form
x′l = xl + δ
(
fl
f¯
− 1
)
xl +
1
N
n∑
j=0
(Mj→l −Ml→j). (7)
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In a single generation, each player with strategy sl has an expected number
δflxl/f¯ of offspring surviving to reproductive age. Mutations occur
independently in the creation of each offspring, with a probability of µ≪ 1
per offspring per generation, and the strategy of the mutated offspring is
chosen randomly among the n+ 1 strategies (strategies s0, . . . , sn), with
equal probability. The expected number of mutations per generation in the
whole population is then µN . Since the population size is assumed to be
large, by the law of large numbers (see, e.g, Rice, 1995) the number Ml→j of
mutated offspring is approximately equal to its expected value, given by:
Ml→j ≈
µ δ N fl xl
(n+ 1) f¯
. (8)
Note that this approximation is valid for all fitness values. Inserting (8) into
(7), we obtain the following expression for the evolutionary dynamics:
x′l = xl + δ
(
fl
f¯
− 1
)
xl + δ µ
(
1
n+ 1
−
fl
f¯
xl
)
. (9)
This equation is similar to the population dynamics introduced by Eigen
(1971) in the study of quasi-species (see also, e.g., Eigen and Schuster, 1977;
Schuster and Sigmund, 1985). Since µ≪ 1, the mutation process is only
expected to have a significant impact on the evolutionary dynamics when the
fitness values for all players are close to the average fitness in the population,
i.e. when the population is close to equilibrium.
We expect that the impact of a finite mutation rate on the evolutionary
dynamics is increasing with the population size. Hence, the evolutionary
dynamics of large groups are of special interest. When the group size is
small, or when only a couple of strategies are present in the population (as
in Section 3), fl may be evaluated from (4) by direct summation. For larger
group sizes, and when many strategies are present in the population, this
becomes impractical due to the rapid growth of the number of terms in the
sum, as shown in Table 1. Thus, in order to investigate the evolutionary
dynamics of larger groups, we need a way to evaluate the fitness values of
players in groups of more than just a few players.
The population is characterised by the probability P li that the number of
cooperating players equals i, in a group with one player using strategy sl and
the n− 1 other players chosen randomly from the population. Since strategy
sl cooperates if i > l we have
fl =
l∑
i=0
P li V(D|i) +
n∑
i=l+1
P li V(C|i− 1). (10)
Thus, efficient calculation of the P li allows for the study of the evolutionary
9
n Number of terms
2 9
3 64
4 625
5 7,776
6 117,649
7 2,097,152
8 43,046,721
9 1,000,000,000
10 25,937,424,601
Table 1
The number of terms in a direct evaluation of fl from (4) for all l, for n = 2 . . . 10.
The number grows very rapidly with n.
dynamics in larger groups. We derive a method for calculating P li , for
arbitrary population compositions, that avoids the rapid growth of the
number of terms in (4). Note that since P li only depends on the distribution
of trigger levels in the population, this method may be applied for any payoff
functions V(C|i) and V(D|i). Using a simple observation on the number of
cooperating players in a group, we obtain:
Theorem 1 In a population of trigger strategies, the probability P li that the
number of cooperating players equals i, in a group with one player using
strategy sl and the n− 1 other players chosen randomly from the population,
is
P li =


0 whenever i = l,
Dl,0n−1 when i = 0,
(x0 + . . .+ xn−1)
n−1 when i = n,(
n−1
i−1(l<i)
)
(x0 + . . .+ xi−1)
i−1(l<i) Dl,in−1−i+1(l< i) otherwise,
(11)
where 1(l < i) is one if l < i and zero otherwise, and D
l,i
m is given by the
recursive formula
Dl,im =


xmn when i = n− 1
M∑
j=0
(
m
j
)
xji+1D
l,i+1
m−j otherwise
(12)
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where M = m+ i+ 2− 1(l < i) − n.
The proof is in the appendix. Note that whenever l < i and l′ < i, P li = P
l′
i ,
so if l < i then P li = P
0
i . Using tables to store evaluated values of D
l,i
m , it is
possible to evaluate the values of P li for all l and i in ∼ n
4 operations. It may
be possible to reduce this to ∼ n3 operations through further exploitations of
the recursive structure of Dl,im .
5 Results
Armed with an efficient method for evaluating the fitness values, we proceed
to the results from our simulations. We have investigated how the
evolutionary dynamics [c.f. (9)] depends on different factors: the payoff
parameters P and T , the initial population, group size and mutation rate.
5.1 Dependency on the payoff parameters
We have measured the long-term degree of cooperation, over the parameter
region of P and T , for various choices of group size n. The initial state of the
population is the always defecting strategy sn.
The long-term degree of cooperation is quantified by the time-average and
standard deviation of the average score in the population, estimated from
long simulations of the system, with the initial transients removed. The
standard deviation of f¯(t) is defined as 〈f¯(t)
2
〉 − 〈f¯(t)〉2, where 〈·〉 denotes
time average.
In the top diagram of Fig. 3, the result for n = 4 is shown. For a large part
of the domain, cooperation is high, while there are two regions, D1 and D2,
with significantly lower payoffs. These two areas are characterised by fixed
points in the dynamics, dominated by strategy pairs (s1, s4) and (s2, s4),
respectively. These correspond to the fixed points given by the evolutionary
stability analysis, discussed in Section 3 and illustrated in Fig. 1. The other
strategies are also present, albeit at a much lower level (of the order of µ):
the abundance of such a strategy is determined by a balance between the net
flow of mutations to the strategy, and the selective pressure on the strategy
from the population. In the limit µ→ 0, D1 and D2 corresponds to
0 < P < 1/3 and 1/3 < P < 2/3, respectively, with 1 < T < 2 in both cases.
In the lower part of Fig. 3, we give the standard deviation of the average
score (the transient excluded). A value significantly above zero indicates a
varying average fitness, such as caused by the presence of oscillatory
11
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Fig. 3. Top Asymptotic time-average of the average payoff in the population (rep-
resented by the grey value, as indicated in the scale to the right of the figure), as a
function of the parameters T and P , for n = 4 and µ = 10−4. Bottom Asymptotic
standard deviation of the average payoff in the population (represented by the grey
value, as indicated in the scale to the right of the figure), as a function of the pa-
rameters T and P . The averages and standard deviations were estimated from long
simulations of the system, with the initial transients removed. The line where the
average payoff equals 0.9 is shown in both panels. Also shown in both panels are
the borders at P = 1/3 and P = 2/3 between the different asymptotically stable
populations, in the limit of infrequent mutations (dashed lines).
dynamics. Note that most of the parameter region is dominated by stable
fixed points, corresponding to the fixed points of the dynamics in the limit
µ→ 0. In the cooperative region, the fixed points are given by a mixture of
cooperating strategies dominated by strategy sn−1. An exception is the ridge
between region D1 and D2. In this region, stable fixed points are
characterised by a mixture of all strategies but the always defecting strategy
sn, and thus a high level of cooperation, contrary to what is expected from
the stationary population in the limit µ→ 0. Furthermore, part of this area
is characterised by oscillating dynamics (as indicated by a non-zero variance
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in the lower part of Fig. 3), between cooperative and defecting strategies.
5.2 Dependency on the initial population
When the system is initialised with a population of s3 strategies, in the case
of group size n = 4, we find that in some parts of the parameter region, there
exist other stable fixed points, see Fig. 4. Most of region D2 in Fig. 3 has
been replaced by a cooperative fixed point dominated by strategy s3, and
parts of region D1 in Fig. 3 has been affected in a similar way. In this case,
cooperation is established and kept stable in the major part of the parameter
region.
In our model we have assumed that mutations are frequent in the
population, which alters the conclusions by Molander as discussed in
Section 3 in two ways: First, the cooperative region we observe for P > 2/3,
is now a stable fixed point, while there is no stable fixed point in that region
in the absence of mutations. Second, in the cooperative region between
regions D1 and D2, the flow of mutations destabilises the fixed point given
by the analysis of Molander discussed above, resulting in either an oscillating
distribution of strategies, or a fixed point involving more than two strategies.
5.3 Dependency on the mutation rate
A more detailed numerical investigation for group size n = 6 is shown in
Fig. 5, where the average payoffs are calculated as functions of P for
T = 1.6. When increasing the mutation rate (from 10−5 to 10−3), less of the
fixed points characterised by strategy pairs (sk, sn) remains. Each interval
( k−1
n−1
, k
n−1
) of P is characterised by two regimes: At the lower end and in the
middle, the population is given by the (sk, sn) equilibrium, indicated by a
thick line. At the higher end, the dynamics is either in a stable limit cycle
(see Fig. 6) or in an equilibrium involving more than two strategies, resulting
in a higher average score. In the higher end of these intervals, the fraction of
cooperating strategies vanish in the infinitesimal mutation limit, so the effect
of the finite mutation flow is that cooperating strategies here gets an
advantage. From the figure it is clear that the regime for which the degree of
cooperation is high, grows with increased mutation rate. The oscillatory
dynamics (c.f. Fig. 6) is characterised by a period where the population is
dominated by cooperating strategies in the absence of the unconditional
defector, but a slow drift due to the mutation flow destabilises that state.
After a short interval in which the defector enters but quickly disappears,
the period starts again with the cooperating strategies. The period of the
oscillations is approximately proportional to (δµ)−1.
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Fig. 4. Top Asymptotic time-average of the average payoff in the population (rep-
resented by the grey value, as indicated in the scale to the right of the figure), as
a function of the parameters T and P , when the population is initialised with a
population of s3 strategies, in the case of group size n = 4 and µ = 10
−4. Bottom
Asymptotic standard deviation of the average payoff in the population (represented
by the grey value, as indicated in the scale to the right of the figure), as a function
of the parameters T and P . The line where the average payoff equals 0.9 is shown
in both panels. Also shown in both panels are the borders at P = 1/3 and P = 2/3
between the different asymptotically stable populations, in the limit of infrequent
mutations (dashed lines).
5.4 Dependency on the group size
In Fig. 7, the average payoff as function of P is shown for four different
group sizes, for T = 1.2. The mutation rate is very low, µ = 10−7, and for
group size n = 3, the results are indistinguishable from the evolutionary
stability analysis based on fixed points involving only two strategies. As the
group size increases, we find that even for this low mutation rate, there are
significant differences compared with the case of infinitesimal mutation flow.
As the group size gets larger, we get both an increasing number and size of
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Fig. 5. The time-averaged average payoff in the population as a function of P , for
n = 6 and T = 1.6, for µ = 10−3 (top), µ = 10−4 (middle), and µ = 10−5 (bottom).
Also shown is the payoff in the limit of infinitesimal µ (thick line) and the payoff P
for a population of pure all-defect (dashed line).
cooperative regions, with the exception of the original cooperative region for
P > (n− 2)/(n− 1). This illustrates that we can get a higher degree of
cooperation when group size is increased for some parameter values, while
for other values cooperation decreases.
As expected, the evolutionarily stable states are increasingly sensitive to the
rate of mutations, as the group size increases. Also for very low rates of
mutations, the average degree of cooperation remains high as the group size
increases, even though the corresponding degree in the limit of infrequent
mutations converges to the payoff for a population of all-defect players.
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Fig. 6. Time evolution of the population when n = 6, µ = 10−4, T = 1.6 and
P = 0.33. The left panel shows the initial transient, and two cycles of the attractor.
The right panel shows the breakdown of cooperation, within a cycle, where strategy
s6 comes to dominate the population for a period of time. During the part of the
cycle where strategy s6 is prominent, the system approaches the population mixture
which is evolutionarily stable when mutations are infrequent. For the value of P used
here, it corresponds to a mixture of strategies s2 and s6. For a period of time, this
mixture of strategies dominates the population. After a while, however, x5 starts to
grow at the expense of x6, and after a while there is another sharp transition where
x5 and x2 grow and x6 decay to very low levels. The period of the oscillations is
approximately proportional to (δµ)−1.
6 Summary and outlook
The n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game is generally assumed to be
characterised by a lower degree of cooperation than the two-person game,
when the players are confined to trigger strategies. We have shown that this
result is weakened when mutations occur frequently in the population, even
though the mutation rate per individual per generation is low, and that it is
due to the long relaxation times of the evolutionary dynamics in certain
areas of the parameter region. This effect is increasing with group size, since
the number of different fixed point regions increases with number of players.
From this, we conclude that an analysis of the evolutionary stability is not
sufficient in order to achieve an understanding of the long-term evolutionary
dynamics.
In order to address this issue, we have derived a deterministic approximation
of the evolutionary dynamics with explicit, stochastic mutation processes,
valid when the population size is large. We then analysed how the
evolutionary dynamics depends on the following factors: mutation rate,
group size, the value of the payoff parameters, and on the initial population.
In order to carry out the simulations for more than just a few individuals, we
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Fig. 7. The time-averaged average payoff in the population for n ∈ {3, 5, 7, 10} (top
to bottom), for T = 1.2. Circles correspond to simulations with µ = 10−7. Also
shown is the payoff in the limit of infinitesimal µ (thick line) and the payoff P for
a population of pure all-defect (dashed line).
have derived an efficient way of calculating the fitness values.
Our results may be summarised as follows: When the mutation rate per
individual and generation is very low, the dynamics is characterised by
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populations that are evolutionarily stable. As the mutation rate is increased,
other fixed points with a higher degree of cooperation become stable. For
some values of the payoff parameters, the system is characterised by
(apparently) stable limit cycles dominated by cooperative behaviour. The
parameter regions corresponding to high degree of cooperation grow in size
with the mutation rate and in number with the group size. For some
parameter values, there are more than one stable fixed point, corresponding
to different structures of the initial population. When the group size is
increased, the average degree of cooperation in the population may increase
or decrease depending on exact payoff parameters and groups size.
The main limitation of this study is that the groups are assumed to persist
for a very long time. It is known that, e.g., the ability to defend against pure
defectors in large groups requires very long games, to offset the cost of initial
cooperative actions when defectors are present in a group
(Boyd and Richerson, 1988). It is thus of interest to extend the analysis of
this paper to investigate how the evolutionary dynamics is affected when the
expected number of iterations is varied.
In this article, we have assumed that all groups are of the same size. In many
situations, however, the group size can be expected to vary from one group
to another within the population. Our results then indicate that a stable
degree of cooperation would be difficult to attain. However, if group size
preferences would be part of the players strategies, one could imagine that
for certain choices of parameters, the evolutionary dynamics may lead to the
formation of groups of certain sizes optimal for a high degree of cooperation.
In a forthcoming study, an analysis of dynamic group formation in the
n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma will be presented.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We begin with a simple observation on the number of players that cooperate
in the iterated game, when no player is unsatisfied with the number of
cooperators in the group. This is then exploited to yield an efficient method
of evaluating the probabilities P li .
Let kj denote the number of players with trigger level j in a given group.
Assume that strategies s0, . . . , si−1 cooperates, that strategies si, . . . , sn
defect, and that no player will switch to defection in the next round. Since
strategy si−1 requires at least i− 1 other players to cooperate in the group,
it cooperates in the next round if and only if
∑i−1
j=0 kj ≥ i. Strategy si defects
in the next round provided
∑i−1
j=0 kj ≤ i. Thus, in a stable configuration with
i cooperators,
∑i−1
j=0 kj = i and ki = 0. From this follows:
Observation 1 Assuming that all players cooperate in the first round,
except those with strategy sn, the number i of players that cooperate in the
stable configuration is determined by: (a) no player has strategy si, (b) i
players have a trigger level less than i, and (c) for the group there is no
trigger level larger than i for which properties (a) and (b) hold.
A randomly composed group with n− 1 players contains k0 . . . kn players,
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with trigger levels 0 . . . n respectively, with probability
(n− 1)!
xk00
k0!
· · ·
xknn
kn!
, where
n∑
i=0
ki = n− 1.
We now consider groups of size n where one player has trigger level l and
n− 1 players are chosen randomly from the population. Assume that
strategies s0, . . . , si cooperates, and that strategies si+1, . . . , sn defects.
Then, in the next round


0 . . . i cooperates ⇔
i∑
j=0
kj + 1(l≤ i) ≥ i+ 1
i+ 1 . . . n defects ⇔
i+1∑
j=0
kj + 1(l≤ i+1) ≤ i+ 1
where 1(C) is one if the condition C is true and zero otherwise. We cannot
have l = i+ 1 in a stable configuration, since it would contradict
Observation 1, so P ll = 0 and we have
i is a stable configuration ⇒
i−1∑
j=0
kj + 1(l<i) = i and ki = 0. (A.1)
This allows us to write P li as the product of two independent sums:
P li =
∑
k0, ..., ki−1 s.t.
i is a stable conf.
∑
ki+1, ..., kn s.t.
k0+ ...+kn=n and
strategies si, . . . , sn defects
n!
k0! · · · kn!
xk00 · · · x
kn
n .
The sum over k0 . . . ki−1 evaluates to
∑
k0, ..., ki−1 s.t.
k0+···+ki−1=i−1(l<i)
xk00
k0!
· · ·
x
ki−1
i−1
ki−1!
=
1
(i− 1(l<i))!
(x0 + . . .+ xi−1)
i−1(l<i) .
Unfortunately, the sum over ki+1 . . . kn is not as simple to evaluate. In order
to evaluate it, we define Dim to be the sum over all groups where m players
with a trigger level greater than i is defecting (weighted by m! to give a nicer
result):
Dl,im =
∑
ki+1, ..., kn s.t.
ki+1+ ...+kn = m, and
strategies si, . . . , sn defects given l
m!
x
ki+1
i+1
ki+1!
· · ·
xknn
kn!
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By applying (A.1) to i . . . n− 1 we see that
Dl,im =
∑
ki+1, ..., kn s.t.
ki+1+ ...+kn = m, and
kj+1+ ...+kn ≥ n−j+1(l< i) for
i≤ j≤n−1
m!
x
ki+1
i+1
ki+1!
· · ·
xknn
kn!
.
The structure of the conditions on the sum allows us to express Dl,im
recursively in terms of Dl,i+1m , and we arrive at (11) and (12).
✷
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